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LINK TO ABSTRACT
In his comment, Mitesh Kataria (2014) makes three main points about a
specific part of our paper (Maniadis, Tufano, and List 2014), namely about Tables
2 and 3. In our paper, we employ these tables in order to illustrate the idea that
very inconclusive post-study probabilities that a tested phenomenon is true may
result from novel, surprising findings. The main arguments in Kataria (2014) are
the following:
First, if P(H0) is unknown, as is often the case with economic
applications, the post-study probability can lead to even worse
inference than the Classical significance test, depending on the quality
of the prior. Second, the simulation in Maniadis et al. (2014) ignores
previous assessments of P(H0) and instead utilizes a selective empirical
setup that favors the use of post-study probabilities. … [Third,]
contrary to what Maniadis et al. (2014) argue, their results do not allow
for drawing general recommendations about which approach is the
most appropriate. (Kataria 2014, abs.)
We believe that our work might have been misunderstood by Kataria.
Moreover, it seems that some of his claims are not supported by relevant empirical
evidence.
Discuss this article at Journaltalk:
http://journaltalk.net/articles/5816
ECON JOURNAL WATCH 11(1)
January 2014: 11-16
1. University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK.
2. University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.
3. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, JANUARY 2014 11
In Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014), our basic aim is to draw on the general
problem of the credibility crisis in disciplines other than economics (Ioannidis
2005; Bettis 2012; Jennions and Moller 2002), and to convey the disquieting news
to economists by relying on insights and tools from the life sciences literature.
While conveying the troubling news, we also emphasize the good news that usually
it takes only a few independent replications to advance considerably the credibility
of empirical exercises. We wish to understand how confident one should be in
the published empirical findings in economics. Simply put, we are not discarding
classical significance testing, just arguing that we should be interpreting it
accurately. For an educated assessment of the empirical evidence we need to know
not just whether tests were significant but also the value of key variables such as
research priors and statistical power. Admittedly, these variables are not easy to
estimate, and in economics it is often, even typically, the case that there is not
much relevant evidence. But this is exactly our point: We wished to show that if we
wish to assess how confident we are in our findings, evidence is lacking in critical
dimensions. Given the recent evidence pointing to non-replicability in several life
sciences (Ioannidis 2012), such lack of evidence may cause serious questions to be
raised about economics as well (see Ioannidis and Doucouliagos 2013; Alexander
2013).
Whereas Kataria claims that “for economic hypotheses, the unconditional
probability P(H0) is hardly ever known” (Kataria 2014, 8), we suggest that the
issue of such knowledge accumulation needs to be regarded as endogenous. If the
investigator’s frame of analysis disregards the variable P(H0), there is no need to
estimate it. Other disciplines have developed meta-analytic methods that can be
fruitfully employed in economics for estimating the relevant variables (Cooper,
Hedges, and Valentine 2009). Replication has a key role in these methods.
To encourage such a structured approach, we illustrated with Tables 2 and
3, using Bayesian language, the fact that we should be cautious of new evidence
and—as we argue later in Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014)—that we should also
increase our efforts to replicate original studies. We clearly note in the paper that
the combinations of parameter values used in Tables 2 and 3 should be thought of
as applying to novel and surprising findings (Maniadis, Tufano, and List 2014, 278,
286 n. 27). So these combinations were truly selected to illustrate what happens in
the case of such findings. Moreover, we acknowledged the difficulty of pinpointing
those combinations exactly (ibid., 286). Essentially, the degree to which our
discipline is characterized by such combinations of priors and power is an empirical
question. We hope that the message of the tables itself will encourage work on this
underexplored question. Once more, we view as one of our key messages that we
lack sufficient evidence to evaluate the credibility of much work in our field. We
join others in prompting economists to grapple with such questions as: What is
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a reasonable estimate for the typical prior in each subfield of economic research?
What is the typical power of a research study? How common is replication in
economics and how common should it be?
Given the scarcity of relevant empirical studies, we find the particular
configurations suggested by Kataria (2014) somewhat unsupported by the
evidence. In particular, there seems to be no empirical foundation for the claims
that “effect sizes follow a standard normal distribution centered at zero
and…scientists only detect and consider effect sizes |d| > 0.2 as relevant” (Kataria
2014, 6). Despite this, Kataria claims that “the neighborhood of P(H0) ≈ 0.16 … is
appreciated to be a more realistic estimate” (ibid., 7). Estimating P(H0) is a difficult
empirical question that would require much more research. With respect to power,
Kataria mentions evidence from the related field of psychology, namely Joseph
Rossi (1990), who estimated that the average power for medium effect sizes is equal
to 0.57. However, it is not clear on which evidence the assumption of medium
effect sizes is based. Furthermore, more recent evidence reveals that typical power
in psychology is about 0.35, even if we assume that the average effect size |d| is
equal to 0.5 (Bakker, van Dijk, and Wicherts 2012).
The spirit of our paper is to encourage work such as the very recent paper by
Le Zhang and Andreas Ortman (2013). They retrospectively estimated the power
of several experimental designs reported in Christoph Engel’s meta-analysis of
dictator games (Engel 2011), and they found that the median level of power was
less than 0.25. It is important to note the critical role of meta-analysis for generating
this piece of new evidence. The point is not to argue in the absence of evidence but
to try to accumulate the necessary evidence. As economists, we hope that our field
is very credible, but we need to provide empirical evidence using the relevant tools.
At this point we need to acknowledge the important issue of “previous
assessments of P(H0),” although Kataria mentioned it without justification. As we
said in Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014), we aimed to make a claim about novel,
surprising results. We do believe that many types of economic research are more
grounded in theory than research in other social sciences, so for them “surprising”
results may not be as important for publication. In fact, Brad DeLong and Kevin
Lang (1992) found that P(H0) is very close to zero for a set of hypotheses published
in top economic journals in the 1980s. If their interpretation—that the referee
process somehow manages to filter true associations—is correct, that would be
reassuring for the credibility of the economics profession. As DeLong and Lang
(1992) acknowledge, however, there are alternative interpretations for their
findings, such as the existence of selection issues and data mining in the discipline,
so their optimistic interpretation should be taken with caution. There is a need for
further research on the matter, following the seminal analysis of DeLong and Lang
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(1992). We are particularly interested in the field of experimental economics, where
we worry that “surprising” findings might be more frequently published.4
From the previous arguments it should be clear that in Maniadis, Tufano,
and List (2014) we did not put forward any general recommendation about which
inference approach, Classical or Bayesian, is the most appropriate. In fact, in the
context of the current “publish or perish” culture (see, e.g., Fanelli 2010) and
the related structure and incentives of the economics knowledge system (Oswald
2007; Glaeser 2008; Young, Ioannidis, and Al-Ubaydli 2008), we merely resort
to Bayesian language to argue in favor of a much more careful interpretation of
Classical inference.
Summing up, we believe that studying systematically the factors that affect
the credibility of empirical findings might have an important role to play in
economics. Meta-analysis and Bayesian tools are of central importance for
conceptualizing the problem and quantifying key variables, and should not be
ignored by economists. Our point was not to argue in favor of a specific
configuration of parameter values, but to show that we cannot ignore factors such
as priors and power, because if we do, something can go very wrong with economic
research.
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